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Abstract: Ofgrowing debate among those concerned with American political culture and 
democratic theory is the modern conception ofliberal democratic theory. This work 
attempts to broaden our understanding ofdemocracy. I will argue that modern 
liberalism has narrowed our conception ofindividual liberty. This narrowedfocus has 
produce a reliance on the use ofpublic regulation and interest group pressure as 
substitutes for civic engagement. In an attempt to movepast a mere critique ofnarrow 
liberalism, this essay will develop a research design and an empirical test to measure our 
current political culture's support for a robust democracy and its future prospects of 
development. 
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The year 1965 was one ofmilestones and victories for liberal democratic ideals. 
Hailed as a centerpiece of the civil rights movement, the 1965 Voting Rights Act 
accomplished an essential step in the evolution of democracy and justice. This 
procedural reform sought to ensure individual rights and liberties through the inclusion of 
minority voice in the political process. For those who fought and died, this national level 
guarantee of political voice and power was designed to ensure equality and freedom 
under uniform laws for all citizens. This was a great achievement which re-focused our 
country on the goal of a more equal and just society. However, the act neglected an 
equally important reason for this reform: the engendering of civic participation and 
meaning. Liberalism has pushed individual freedoms and equality to new understandings 
but has ignored the equally important role of civics in our democracy. An essential 
normative claim of this essay is the requirement of continuous input and oversight by 
"the people" in order for democracy to make the virtuous claim of self-government and 
the civic improvement of its citizens. Modem liberalism narrowed our understanding of 
democracy. It excluded the formative role of participation in the pursuit of individual 
rights. 
Liberalism and democratic theory in general depend on the three fundamental 
pillars of self-government for their foundation: individual freedom, public regulation, and 
civic meaning. Liberalism in the last fifty years has focused on the first of those pillars, 
using the second as a crutch, at the expense of the third. This is not a new observation; 
many authors have identified the tension liberalism has produced in modem democracy 
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in different ways. Theodore 1. Lowi's analysis of the "second republic" in American 
history characterized by the explosion ofbureaucracy explores the far-reaching effects of 
a liberalism narrowed to a focus on regulative bureaucracy (Lowi, 1979). Lowi's 
"interest group liberalism" took the path of least resistance--it increased individual 
freedoms and government responsiveness through pluralistic access to regulative 
bureaucracy instead of engendering change in the hearts and minds of the citizenry. 
As Stephan Holmes argued in his work, Passions and Constraints, traditional 
liberal democratic theory had a heavy dose of positive consitutionalism. Constitutions, as 
early liberals envisioned, not only limit government power to ensure individual freedom 
(negative constitutionalism). But they also establish structures that, "can ensure that the 
will of the people is formed through open public debate ... [and] can enhance the 
intelligence and legitimacy of decisions made" (positive constitutionalism), (Holmes, 
1995:8). According to Holmes, traditional liberalism both assumes and requires the 
engendering of participation and active individual engagement to counter regulatory 
power. In the end Holmes states that, "liberalism is a necessary, though not sufficient, 
condition for some measure ofdemocracy in any modem state" (Holmes, 1989:9). In 
what he suggests is a co-existence, liberalism allows for and assumes republican concepts 
and participation. 
James Morone in his work, The Democratic Wish, identifies the "dread and 
yearning" of the American people (Morone, 1991). The dread of government, stems 
from "the perception that public power threatens civic liberty" (Morone, 1991 :2). The 
conflicting yearnings of the American people comprise the democratic wish. Key to the 
democratic wish, "is an image of the people-a single, united, political entity with the 
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capacity, as John Adams put it, to 'think, feel, reason, and act'" (Morone, 1991:5). The 
American people have always assumed and strived for active participation according to 
Morone. The American ideology, as he terms it, is based on self-government, meaning 
active popular participation to prevent government action without the consent of the 
people. However, a stronger yearning, individualism, has allowed the American people 
to be deluded into thinking the expansion of government is their own will and is actually 
protecting their desire to ensure self-government. Morone's portrait of democracy's 
development in America ends in a disheartening conclusion. 
The state and its bureaucracy grew; however, they never won a legitimate 
role at the center of our society. Instead, two centuries of state building 
produced a string ofmetaphoricallegitimators for public administration: a 
mirror of the people (as the revolutionaries fancied their assemblies), a 
reflection of the people's choices (Jacksonians), the computation of 
disinterested science (Progressives), the outcome of the pluralistic political 
market (some New Dealers). Each formula was an effort to rest 
administrative authority on an external, automatically functioning source 
oflegitimacy. Each was a different escape from the same threat-public 
officials who make independent judgements, ministers who think. 
(Morone, 1991:323) 
Morone argues that a republican yearning has existed throughout our history but that the 
yearning to be unencumbered has prevailed in shaping our democracy. I would argue 
that, while this may be the case to limited degrees, it simply reflects the logical balancing 
of republican participatory ideals and individual freedoms in earlier periods. Only in the 
twentieth century has this delusion that bureaucracy can be an effective substitute for 
participation become hegemonic. 
Michael Sandel's analysis of the American public philosophy supports the above 
assertion. In his work, Democracy's Discontent, he defines the modern manifestation of 
liberalism as one that "asserts the priority of fair procedures over particular ends, the 
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public life it infonns might be call the procedural republic" (Sandel, 1996:4). Several 
key points and ideas are argued from this definition. The first is that "freedom consists in 
the capacity ofpersons to choose their values and ends" (Sandel, 1996:5). Sandel tenns 
this the priority of the right over the good. This means that our right to choose our own 
good trumps any controlling collective good. There is no common conception of the good 
life. Virtue comes in allowing citizens to choose their own ends. The second major point 
to be made from Sandel's definition is the implied neutrality ofthe state. In his 
procedural republic, the state does not perfonn any fonnative function. Lowi's second 
republic, Holmes's negative constitutionalism, and Morone's self-delusion are different 
conceptions ofvery similar arguments. The explosion ofbureaucracy has insulated the 
people from their government and de-emphasized civic participation. 
An essential flaw in Sandel and other critics ofliberalism is their juxtaposition of 
liberalism to republicanism. Republicanism is not in opposition to liberalism. As some 
have suggested these two public philosophies combine and rely on each other to maintain 
self-government. Richard Dagger for example argues that, "just as a liberal society must 
be able to count on a sense of community and civic engagement, so the republican polity 
that Sandel now champions must be able to count on a commitment to liberal principles, 
such as tolerance, fair play, and respect for others" (Dagger, 1998:4). Democracy relies 
on both philosophies for development and regime support. Without both sides of the 
equation, democracy can be undercut. Narrow liberalism has de-emphasized, but not 
destroyed, republicanism. A resurgence of republicanism should not attempt to discredit 
a commitment to a broader liberal theory. 
4 
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"Central to republican theory is the idea that liberty depends on sharing in self­
government ... sharing in self-rule involves ... deliberating with fellow citizens about 
the common good and helping to the destiny of the political community" (Sandel, 
1996:5). Sandel misunderstood the implications ofhis own definition of republicanism. 
This definition does not demand a communitarian model, where the common good has 
priority over individual rights. Nor does this definition demand republicanism be set in 
opposition to liberalism. As Richard Dagger points out in his critique of Sandel, "we 
should pause to consider whether republicanism and liberalism share enough features to 
make a hybrid possible-perhaps in the form of a 'more civic-minded liberalism' that 
might be called republican liberalism" (Dagger, 1998:26). While Dagger seeks to find a 
hybrid, I contend the relationship should be conceptualized more as a necessary co­
existence. Republicanism and liberalism are distinct schools ofdemocratic thought 
which cannot be combined into one overarching theory. Yet, in the practical application 
of democracy on a society, each requires the other for foundations and support. On the 
one hand, liberalism relies on republican virtue to create the type of citizens required for 
self-government. This, in turn, is the vehicle for individual freedom and liberties. On the 
other hand, republicanism relies on liberalism's commitment to tolerance, freedom and 
fairness to create ajust society. Both are necessary but not sufficient for democracy's 
development. 
Narrow liberalism does not allow for what Sandel terms "a formative politics," 
(the cultivation ofcitizens). However, traditional liberalism accepted and relied upon the 
republican idea of a non-neutral state. Holmes' argument for positive constitutionalism 
not only allows for but also requires the cultivation ofcitizens able to and inclined to 
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implementation of the twentieth century. "The republican conception of freedom, unlike 
the liberal conception, require a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in citizens the 
qualities of character self-government requires" (Sandel, 1996:6). Republicanism 
envisions a formative project. The cultivation of civic-minded individuals is essential to 
self-government, and therefore is essential to the protection of individual rights as well as 
the pursuit of the common good. Narrow liberalism's dilemma is that it has secured 
rights through procedural reform instead of through societal consensus. These advances 
in individual rights help us develop as individuals and as a society. We must engage in a 
formative project to change the hearts and minds of our citizenry and, this cannot be done 
through regulation alone. This must be done through open debate and engagement and a 
formative state. The challenge is to develop new ways to engender this type of citizenry 
without coercion under our new understandings of individual rights. It is not, as Sandel 
states, that "the liberal vision of freedom lacks the civic resources to sustain self­
government," but that the modem implementation of narrow liberalism lacks the 
necessary institutional mechanisms. 
As opposed to the traditional, wide-reaching ideals found in liberal thought, the 
liberalism that has dominated the twentieth century has produced a society and a 
government focused on achievement in only one area. The focus on individual, private 
freedom has achieved great strides for the citizens ofthis country, but at what cost? An 
essential piece of democracy is the civic ideal. Narrow liberalism has neglected the 
importance of civic culture and instead has relied solely on procedural regulation to 
maintain a government truly for the people. In the end, narrow liberalism has used 
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procedural mechanisms to expand individual freedom while assuming that those 
mechanisms they have created will keep government in check and lessen the need for 
civic engagement. 
Self-government on autopilot is the order of the day for modem liberal theory. 
The reliance on regulative bureaucracy allows citizens to be concerned only with their 
own private, usually economic, well-being and undermine the crucial function of civic 
participation. The total de-emphasis of civic meaning and interdependence will not lead 
to a total destruction of democracy and free will. It will, however, prevent society's 
advance toward a more just and morally virtuous society. The normative argument thus 
leads to an empirical claim. The goal of this essay is to clarify the normative issues in 
order to shape our understanding of the tangible impact of narrow liberalism on our 
democracy. To fully understand this somewhat meandering line of logic, several basic 
assumptions and definitions must be established. What follows is a discussion on 
democracy, self-government, concepts of development and, in the end, a proposal for 
measuring civic culture values concretely in terms of democratic institutions, actions, and 
norms. 
I. The Pillars of Self-Government 
Any attempt to move beyond our current state and develop our democracy into a 
more just and virtuous milieu for individual growth and freedom requires an analysis of 
the pillars of self-government and how they affect future development. I have identified 
three broad categories: public regulation, civic meaning, and individual liberty. These 
pillars of self-government provide the foundation of democracy and its development. A 
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regulative body checking the government and providing the structures for participation; 
civic meaning and the sense of community, nation and personal relevance it creates; and 
private individual freedoms and autonomy comprise those fundamental pillars of self­
government. Each of these pillars, in distinctive ways, adds to the development of 
democracy. They are also interdependent. Public regulation is an unavoidable result of 
government of any kind, and it is a very virtuous product when under control and in the 
hands of the people. Without regulative bureaucracy, a society cannot institutionalize 
ways to protect and engender civic meaning or individual liberty. Civic meaning, our 
sense of whom we are in relation to those around us, is undermined in the absence of 
individual liberties. Without the production of civic meaning, individual freedom loses 
some of its virtue and may become undermined as well. 
James Morone was correct in as much as democracy necessarily creates 
bureaucracy as a vehicle of regulation (Morone, 1990). Self-government is still a 
government. Governments are administrative and bureaucratic in nature. The concern is 
to what purpose the bureaucracy exists. Is it there as an arm of a dictator's repressive 
regime? To collect a monarch's tribute? To carry out national interest group demands? 
Or is the purpose of bureaucracy to implement the will of the people and protect the 
agreed concepts of society; e.g. freedom, justice, and equality? In the case of self­
government, the type of regulation created performs two essential functions: not only 
does it address and protect private interests, but it also acts as a public check. 
Stephan Holmes identifies constitutionalism as the key regulative actor in limiting 
a government's power and shaping our society (Holmes, 1995). For Holmes, 
constitutions perform both a restrictive and facilitative function. Liberalism of the 
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twentieth century has embraced "the doctrine that constitutions are primarily preventative 
or inhibitory devices, meant to check or repress tyranny and other abuses ofpower" 
(Holmes, 1995:7). No doubt this is true and a very necessary role for constitutions and 
the regulative elements of democracy in general. However, the unquestioned focus 
merely on restriction has led to an acceptance on an ever-increasing regulative body. 
This body has grown far past constitutional limits and concepts. Bureaucratic agents are 
now given the tools ofpower to define societal norms, set standards, and determine 
governmental bounds on private life without ever receiving one vote. As a pillar of self­
government, regulative bodies must not only check government power, but also perform 
the facilitative role of structuring institutions to promote and channel public debate into 
the policy making process. Unlike constitutional-level institutions, the current system is 
tied to interest group pluralism and therefore cannot accomplish this. The reformers of 
the 1960s attempted to engage the public within the framework of the current system and 
only produced further bureaucratic insulation from individual debate and discussion and . 
an even greater focus on national interest groups (Harris and Milkis, 1989). 
Self-government produces a higher meaning for the citizen. This more virtuous 
meaning is a product of self-government's requirement ofparticipation. Virtue is 
increased by shifting the focus from one's own position to a focus on one's contribution 
to the making ofajust and virtuous society. Citizens' moral virtue is increased by their 
awareness of and concerned for those around them. "More than a scheme for majority 
rule or individual liberty or equal rights, democracy had as its highest purpose the moral 
and civic improvement of the people" (Sandel, 1996:220). As Sandel and others argue 
with success, the modem liberal notion ofunencumbered or bracketed selves is 
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such, it is important to realize that we must accept responsibility to engage in self­
government in order to improve our personal virtue. Self-government produces higher 
civic virtue and individual meaning through its requirement ofparticipation and 
engagement in the search for a just and virtuous society. 
The third pillar of self-government is individual liberty. Each individual's 
freedom and autonomy stems directly from self-government's commitments and ends. 
Individuals are free because they engage in and have an effect on their government. By 
voting, debating and contributing to democracy, we free individuals to pursue "the good 
life" in whatever shape we envision. This pillar of self-government has been the sole 
focus and desire ofnarrow liberalism. While essential and virtuous, the production of 
individual freedom as defined by modem liberals has mutated our system's regulative 
structures and powers and has de-emphasized and undermined the production of civic 
meaning. A broadening of our understanding of democracy and all its essential 
characteristics is required. 
II. The Surface Characteristics of Democracy 
Democracy has been stated simply and in seemingly un-mistakable terms. 
Abraham Lincoln's oft quoted assertion, "government of the people, by the people, and 
for the people," seems to suggest what any fourth grader would tell you: democracy is 
simply free government, based on the sovereignty ofthe people, advancing the will ofthe 
people. This type of government can be easily distinguished from non-democratic forms. 
Clear and unmistakable characteristics define a democracy, but only describe democracy 
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at the surface. These surface characteristics are important and necessary to democracy's 
foundation, but do not guarantee a robust version of self-government capable of 
producing virtuous citizens. In fact, the four surface characteristics are termed such 
because they are only products of the first two pillars of democracy, individual freedom 
and public regulation. A democracy based only on two legs cannot stand. The third 
pillar of democracy, civic meaning, produces more subtle characteristics of democracy, 
which I term foundational characteristics. This distinction will shape the development of 
the empirical claim of the essay and lead to a research design. 
Elections are the most readily measured surface characteristic of democracy. 
Along with other structural mechanisms, elections are designed to ensure representation, 
both in the legislative assembly and in policy outputs. To be a truly democratic influence 
on policy-makers, elections must be structured to ensure a wide definition of those who 
are qualified to vote. This is for democratic legitimacy and to ensure that representative 
government is indeed, representative. The great success of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
was that it widened the electorate. But even with this seemingly clear characteristic, 
some distinctions and explanations must be made. Democratic theorists have debated two 
elements or conceptions of the role of elections. I will present these as the idealist 
version and the realist version of elections. Joseph Schumpeter articulates the realist 
position: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1997:366). Elections simply serve as a 
check on those in power, but only in so far as they allow "the people" to choose which set 
of elites will govern. According to Schumpeter, idealists ignore the essential role of 
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elections as tools for selection of leaders. True government by the people is unattainable 
and impractical. Democratic theory is moving toward this new realization. The idealists 
contend that free and open elections are part of the essential process of debate and 
discussion. Elections are not designed to give the populous direct control over policy; 
they are principally designed to translate the doctrine of popular sovereignty into an 
operating principle or institutional practice (Mayo, 1997:372). Elections are obvious and 
essential points in the process of self-government by which the will of "the people" is 
measured. For idealists (and I count my self as one), elections also point to a deeper role 
and value in democracy. They not only allow Schumpeter's "throwing the bums out" but 
also ensure that those in power listen to public debate and govern accordingly in between 
elections. Ifrepresentatives fail in this task, they risk the same fate as those they 
replaced. 
Another surface characteristic of democracy is a commitment to freedoms, both 
political and individua1. Political freedom refers to the ability to freely choose a 
representative body. Voters must be allowed to make their own decision without 
coercion or intimidation. Essential to this process is the existence of formal rules such as 
secret ballot, freedom to run for office, freedom of press and speech, and freedom to 
assemble and organize for political purposes (Mayo 1997:374). The legitimate operation 
and inclusion of opposition parties and opinions is a measure a government's 
commitment to democracy. Governments such as the former Soviet Union, Communist 
China, and the hegemonic PRI in Mexico display all the trappings of democratic 
elections, but these are only cosmetic. Preordained election results and the lack of any 
viable opposition sweep away any claim to democracy. Fundamental to democracy's 
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Rights of privacy, religion, basic education, and economic self-determination are just 
some of the rights demanded. The protection of individual rights maintains and 
engenders popular support for the regime and a sense ofgovernment working to protect 
each citizen. This understanding of rights is part ofwhat Richard Wilson calls 
"compliance ideologies": those standards and norms, decided on by society, and ensured 
by the government, which protect and stabilize the current political structure (Wilson, 
1992). 
Commitment to political and social equality is also a necessary trademark of 
modem democracy. This distinction parallels democracy's commitment to freedoms. 
Political equality refers to electoral structure and outcomes. For political equality to be 
achieved each citizen shall have one vote, each vote shall count equally and the 
representatives elected shall be proportional to the number of equal votes (Mayo 
1997:372). Political equality ensures legitimacy and translates popular sovereignty into, 
structural outcomes. Social equality is measured through the policy outcomes but is 
achieved through wide popular consensus. This implies another problem with narrow 
liberalism: modem liberals measure success or progress in procedural reforms rather than 
societal attitudes and norms. The assumption is that government can produce mass 
attitudinal change through regulation. If democracy's highest purpose is the civic 
improvement of citizens and this is accomplished through individual participation and 
engagement, a theory as to how society as a whole improves is implied. A basic 
argument of this work is that social attitudes are altered one person at a time and not by 
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centralized regulation. But at this juncture, it is important to note that modern democracy 
must display a commitment both to political equality and to social equality. 
Majoritarianism is the fourth surface characteristic. It presents an internal 
tension, which must also be addressed in any attempt to define democratic structure. 
Democracy's claim to representation is seemingly at odds with the notions of majority 
rule. Some argue that, ifthe will of the majority prevails, those in the minority are not 
represented in policy. As Schumpeter put it, "the will of the majority is the will of the 
majority and not the will of 'the people, '" (Schumpeter, 1997:368). But this does not 
necessarily exclude the claim of government "by the people." As MacIver, Mayo, 
Lindsay and others have argued, democracy is not a form of policy development; it is a 
system to determine who governs and to what ends (Cohen, 1997). Many consider 
majoritarian aspects of democracy beneficial and stabilizing when counter-balanced with 
a society wide commitment to minority rights. The very fact that the majority prevails 
when universal consensus cannot be achieved, which is almost always the case, only 
ensures democracy's survival and continued mass support ofthe government structure. It 
is important to note that this is not a carte blanche for Tocqueville's feared "tyranny of 
the majority." In the end this benefits all society members by maintaining egalitarian 
aspects and structural opportunities for minorities, while maintaining stability and long­
term support. 
The surface characteristics of democracy display the important products of the 
first and second pillars of democracy. However, they also point to their own inability to 
ensure and protect the third pillar of democracy, civic meaning. Elections are designed to 
begin the process oftranslating popular sovereignty into an operating principle but cannot 
14 
•
 
alone create a virtuous society or virtuous citizens; this requires a more personal and 
continuous participation. Commitments to freedom and equality are both essential 
products in structuring a virtuous society but cannot alone encourage the engagement of 
citizens in the formation of community. Much like the first three, majoritarianism 
provides necessary stability and regime support but does not, in itself, engage citizens in 
the formative project. To produce civic meaning and virtue in society, we tum to the 
foundational characteristics ofdemocracy. 
III. The Foundational Characteristics of Democracy 
Democratic theorists have been struggling for centuries with the notions of 
participation and community ends, both ofwhich are essential products ofdemocracy and 
its future progress. These foundational characteristics form a symbiotic relationship with 
the third pillar of self-government, civic meaning. Participation and community are at 
once the results and causes ofcivic meaning. Individual level engagement presupposes, 
consent. By debating, citizens contribute to the polity and thus consent to societal norms 
and structures. This process of contributing to the formation ofnorms is the mechanism 
for civic improvement. Civic meaning enables the cultivation ofcitizens and a 
commitment to broader, community-based ends. And, by tum, when a society cultivates 
citizens, it produces civic meaning. 
For democracy to make the virtuous claim of self-government there must be 
continuous input and oversight by "the people." This is a very different claim than 
modem liberal theorists have pragmatically pushed into practice. Narrow liberalism's 
tunnel vision toward an expansion of individual rights and liberties has resulted in the use 
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ofbureaucracy and interest groups organization in place of true individual participation. 
In other words, narrow liberalism has developed a system of incentives that encourages 
pursuing narrow ends via interest groups. Democracy cannot stand on interest groups 
and regulation alone so that, individuals may spend all of their efforts toward their own 
ends. In order to develop and advance to a more virtuous kind of democracy, the 
expansions in individual rights and procedural regulation must be matched in kind by a 
new conception and understanding of civic meaning and new ways to engender the 
formative project of cultivating citizens capable of self-government. This is a very basic 
fact that liberal policy of the last fifty years has unintentionally undermined. 
Even activists movements of the late 1960s and 1970s, such as the 
environmentalists, were subject to the structural and cultural effects of narrow liberalism. 
The environmental movement was part of a larger movement to get citizens "plugged 
back into" government and policy making. However, the emphasis and tactics employed 
by the environmental movement display a complete adaptation to modem liberalism's 
pluralistic structure. Individual citizens and small community action groups were not 
effective. Only after a national movement funding professional lobbyists in Washington 
D.C. was formed did they view their work as successful. With the creation in 1970 of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, environmentalists gave decision-making power to 
bureaucrats, not elected officials or community groups. Many of these bureaucrats were 
actually lobbyists formerly working for citizen groups who moved over to the agency 
(Harris and Milkis, 1998: 225-230). They bought into narrow liberalism's reliance on 
regulative bureaucracy and judicial activism by a federal agency to ensure that private 
interests (the protection ofthe environment) were achieved. 
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opted interest group. As long as their professional lobbyists and the EPA were on the 
job, environmentalists did not need to stay engaged in the debate and decision-making 
process. In effect, environmentalists accepted public regulation as a substitute for civic 
participation. According to Richard Harris and Sindey Milkis, the deregulation efforts of 
the Reagan administration was a direct result not only of Reagan's larger philosophical 
commitment to downsizing government, but also to the tactics and structure of the 
environmental movement now virtually controlled by an executive agency and not 
private citizens. "It was this involvement of public lobbyists in the courts and the 
bureaucracy that many in the Reagan administration found obnoxious ... it seemed the 
height of hypocrisy for public lobbyists to proclaim themselves tribunes of the people and 
champions of participation, while fighting their greatest battles in the courts, the least 
democratic branch" (Harris and Milkis, 1989:226). The Reagan administration was able 
to cripple an executive agency achieving widely supported goals because the citizen 
participation needed to prevent this action was absent. The system put in place by narrow 
liberalism encourages this type of interest group pressure and reliance on public 
regulation, which in tum can endanger the effective translation of popular will into 
policy. 
At this juncture a brief return to representation is necessary. The argument to be 
made for a newfound emphasis on participation begs the question of what participation is 
and how effectively it is translated into policy. At a most basic level, participation is 
simply voting. But as stated previously, this does not ensure the designed representation 
both in the assemblies and in the policy outputs. Some would argue that to be truly 
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virtuous, participation must have a direct effect on policy. Otherwise, it has been diluted 
in its power, and "the people" are a little less self-governed. While in a utopian setting 
this argument might be logically posited, it cannot be a serious consideration in the 
modern world. 
As suggested by several authors, the Athenian model and universal assent can no 
longer define participation. Participation, as a foundational characteristic of democracy, 
now means the opportunity and ability to engage in debate. Each member of a society 
must undertake the absolute necessity of discussing the issues of the day. As A.D. 
Lindsay argued, "what matters is not that the final decision of government should be 
assented to by every one, but that every one should have somehow made his contribution 
to that decision" (Lindsay, 1997:362-3). It is the responsibility of the assembly to set the 
agenda and provide a calming force to the volatile winds of public opinion, but without 
free and open debate, assemblies can make no claim of continuous representation. In 
modern society, we see the unmistakable breakdown in participation (debate, discussion, 
and voting). Narrow liberalism has implanted a reliance on regulative bureaucracy to 
ensure individual rights from government encroachment. The concern is two-fold. Under 
a structure reliant on regulation and bureaucracy, how legitimate is the claim of self-rule? 
Also as Lindsay points out, debate should lead to responsive representative assemblies. 
Is this input occurring at all, and if it is, is the bureaucracy listening and responsive? In 
reality, the regulative bureaucracy and the system are not responsive to the right kind of 
input, which produces the formative ends of government, i.e. individual contributions to 
the debate shaping the collective good. On the other hand, they are perhaps too 
responsive to the narrow concerns of interest groups. Lindsay's pronouncement, "what 
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matters is not that the people should rule, but that they think they should rule; and it has 
given undue emphasis to the element of consent over the element of discussion" (Lindsay 
359), now seems even more ominous in the face of a democracy purposefully put on 
autopilot. The pursuit of individualism has allowed society to be deluded into thinking 
regulative bureaucracy and interest groups can be substituted for the individual 
participation contributing to the collective good that is necessary for the growth of 
virtuous citizens. 
Individualism and a reliance on regulative bureaucracy alone cannot advance 
democracy and help our society develop the broader, community-based ends which are in 
turn required for the production ofvirtuous citizens. "Democracy is a kind of community 
government" (Cohen, 1997:357). This simple observation has not been advanced in the 
narrow liberalism of the twentieth century, yet I maintain that community is the second 
foundational product of self-government. If the goal ofour society is to produce full and 
complete virtuous citizens, attention must be given to the notion that we cannot act as if 
our lives and actions affect no one but ourselves. It is an inescapable truth that we, as 
Sandel terms it, are "encumbered." This fact is a strength not a weakness. Without 
interpersonal contact and responsibility we cannot become complete human beings. 
Long ago John Dewey noted this fact "The keynote ofdemocracy as a way oflife 
may be expressed as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in 
the formation of values that regulate the living of men together: which is necessary from 
the standpoint ofboth the general social welfare and the full development ofhuman 
beings as individuals," (Dewey, 1997:378). Two important elements can be found in the 
above claim. First, it is absolutely essential" for the participation ofevery mature human 
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being." Working with the above description of participation, the reason for its necessity 
should become clear. Democracy as in all fonns of government establishes and enforces 
community nonns and standards. Without individuals engaging and participating in our 
government, it ceases to be our government; we cease to be self-ruled. As Dewey clearly 
argued, "all those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing 
and managing them" (Dewey, 1997: 378). "General social welfare" cannot be 
detennined, let alone achieved, with a completely atomistic, self-interested view of the 
individual. Ifwe understand "general social welfare" to be an aggregate of developing 
complete and virtuous citizens, we must require consent by contribution and the 
development of reason through debate, interaction and a widened understanding of those 
around us. Self-interested consumers cannot achieve individual development as long as 
they remain unengaged. In addition, society's commitment to freedom, equality, justice, 
and virtue require input from the people. Even the narrow liberal's definition of "general 
social welfare" cannot be achieved and protected without civic-minded individuals. 
A brief discussion on ends versus means should be helpful to my point. Since 
Hobbes, liberals have debated whether the goal of civil society should be the 
development of shared ends or shared means. My contention is that shared means are 
necessary but not sufficient. Democracy requires civic individuals engaged in their 
community to develop consensus on shared means to individual development and 
personal definitions of success. However, in the process, we also have at least one shared 
end: the development of a virtuous society that allows for the growth of complete human 
beings. Narrow liberalism's de-emphasis on civic meaning and the fonnative project has 
put us in danger oflosing the recognition ofthis shared end. 
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John Rawls discussed this process in tenns of concepts and conceptions (Rawls, 
1971: 9-10). The goal of our democracy is to achieve a consensus on the concept of 
justice. It is absolutely essential that a self-governed society actively engages in and 
debates that concept continuously. This is due to the fact that each individual's 
conception of those concepts ofjustice, freedom, toleration and equality changes and 
develops over time. Conceptions are the necessary building blocks of concepts. Let's 
consider the concept of fairness. There are many conceptions of fairness: the central 
themes are equity versus efficiency. When individuals engage and debate the concept, 
their conception changes. Eventually a new consensus of the concept of fairness is 
achieved through changing conceptions. We, as a society, have grown and moved toward 
our goal ofmore complete individuals. There are many defendable conceptions ofjustice 
our society might share, but we are in danger of forgetting that we need to share a 
consensus of the concept. 
The challenge for our democracy is to find new and inventive ways to engender 
and support civic-minded citizens without coercion or trampling the advances we have 
made in our shared concepts of individual rights and freedoms. "Merely legal guarantees 
of the civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly are of little avail if in 
our daily life freedom of communication, the give and take of ideas, facts, experiences, is 
choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred. These things destroy the 
essential condition of the democratic way," (Dewey, 1997:382). Democracy is not 
simply a structure established by our founding fathers that we can ignore and disengage 
from in the pursuit of self-interested individualistic goals. The foundation of democracy 
relies on the need for civic engagement and development. Without it, our development as 
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complete human beings and a truly just and virtuous society is hampered. "The heart and 
final guarantee of democracy is in the free gatherings of neighbors on the street comer to 
discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of the day, and in the gatherings 
of friends in the living rooms ofhouses and apartments to converse freely with one 
another," (Dewey, 1997:381-382). The challenge is to find new neighborhoods, new 
street comers, new ways of engaging our citizens and engendering civic virtue. 
IV. Liberalism's Tension Revisited 
Traditional liberalism was composed of two elements. The first is that a new 
conception of self-interested, rational individuals seeking their own personal ends shaped 
an understanding of private freedom and autonomy. But in addition, liberalism accepted 
and understood the need for participation and a sense of community and nation in order 
to achieve and protect individual liberty. Holmes recognized this and has critiqued 
modem liberalism as losing sight of this second element. In an attempt to find the path of 
least resistance for the attainment of individual liberty, liberalism has narrowed its 
definition of democracy and self-government. Narrow liberalism in its practical 
application has transformed Holmes' envisioned two-fold regulative body, one that 
included negative and positive constitutionalism. Narrow liberalism has redefined the 
role of regulation to that of a disinterested, neutral structure ensuring individual freedom 
and popular will without the need for costly dialogue at the community level. Narrow 
liberalism is very efficient but it is a short-run, shortsighted efficiency. Mills' 
hypothetical enlightened despot can be instituted according to liberals. But Mills' 
original objection is still valid (Mills, 1991 :238-239). Twentieth century liberalism 
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assumes and hopes regulative bureaucracy can replace participation as the "self' in self­
government, and that the ends of government/or the people rather than by the people, 
will be enough to create virtuous citizens. This is a naive and ultimately self-defeating 
position. Without advancement and growth in all pillars of self-government and a 
strengthening of all pillars ofdemocracy, we as a society and as individuals cannot 
develop beyond our current understandings and virtue. Essential to the goal of individual 
development, is the relationship between engagement and participation, which establishes 
consent by contribution and requires reason that promotes individual development. 
Narrow liberalism relies on a neutral state to carry out the functions previously 
required by civic participation. It requires a neutral state so that those in power cannot 
abuse power. Not only is this naive; it is undesirable. Concepts such as toleration, 
freedom, and fairness are not neutral; they are moral value judgments about what is 
"right." A totally neutral state protecting and enforcing non-neutral values is impossible. 
The focus on individual liberty, as modern liberalism has defined it, de-emphasizes and, 
reduces civic virtue. Narrow liberalism presupposes a collective agreement on concepts 
ofjustice and liberty. But if the debate over the concept ofjustice is robust (efficiency 
versus equity), our debate over liberty is stalemated and stagnated by this system. 
This is not to argue that a democratic government should not act as arbiter 
between social groups and competing ideals. Some ofdemocracy's surface 
characteristics perform this function. Elections ensure channels to government and allow 
competing voices to be heard. Commitments to freedom and equality provide protection 
and allow minority groups to compete with the majority in free and open debate. Under 
this structure, a majoritarian outcome ensures that a small but powerful social group, i.e. 
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elites, cannot impose their views. More to the central point, narrow liberalism has 
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focused on government's role as arbiter in order to expand individual's ability to focus 
solely on their own interests. 
As the case of Hungary in the late 1960s will demonstrate, this type of focus and 
societal atmosphere can cause great setbacks for democracy's development. In 1968, 
Hungarian leader Janos Kadar received Soviet approval for his "New Economic 
Mechanism." Kadarism, as it came to be known, was a product of the politics of 
liberalization. A society starting to organize and cry out for democracy was effectively 
bought offby economic liberalization. A society convinced of atomistic, consumerist, 
economic driven concepts of progress and success was bribed into abandoning any 
dreams of democracy in return of some measure ofmarket reforms. Kadarism, "kept 
society in a diffuse and inarticulate state, in a childish dependence; it deprived people of 
efficient institutions of interest intermediation and participation ... it liberalized people 
without giving them rights and real freedom" (Hankiss, 1990:81). Democratic reforms 
and development were delayed in Hungary for decades by a deluded understanding of 
what freedom and democracy really meant. 
Narrow liberalism's focus on the individual freedom pillar of self-government 
has greatly affected the other two pillars. While incredibly responsive to the people as 
organized interest groups, our regulative bureaucracy is now massive, pervasive, 
intrusive and non-responsive or accountable to the people as individual contributors to 
our public discourse. Our regulative bureaucracy allows for and promotes contributions 
in the form of is routinized imposters parading massive money-making special interest 
groups as new ways to engage in our public discourse. As a nation, America has seen its 
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sense of community and civic engagement languish in the last quarter of the twentieth 
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century. The great gains of narrow liberalism should not be undone or attacked. They 
are essential to our further development and represent great achievements for democracy. 
However, just as important is a renewed sense of civic responsibility and engagement. 
Our society and our government must redefine their roles and responsibilities. We must 
embrace our newfound individual rights and freedoms, but we must also embrace the 
challenge of finding new ways to produce civic meaning and engender participation if we 
are to develop our democracy to the next level. 
V. The Nature of Development 
The term development requires some definition at this point. To develop means 
to change, to redefine society and political culture, to broaden our understanding of 
humanity and ourselves. The common concepts of what is just, fair, virtuous, and 
morally desirable for individuals and society needs to be continually questioned. When a 
society has successfully redefined Rawls' conceptions, then society has moved to a new 
phase of development. The moment of development is not distinct. Phases do not come 
in neat bundles, easily identifiable or set off by profound or cataclysmic events. 
Development is a slow, incremental process. It is based on individual agency. Through 
our life experiences, personal understandings and beliefs on rights and obligations, we 
alter and refine our personal ideology. So too, this is the way for society. The aggregate 
of each individual's ability to debate, discuss and experience new ideas and people allows 
our society to slowly change its dominant understanding of our own political culture and 
thus political development occurs. 
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In Compliance Ideologies, Richard Wilson outlines an argument conceptualizing 
political culture as ideology and on the development of democracy. A society's ideology 
is the set of agreements and norms which maintain and stabilize its political environment. 
Wilson terms his concept of political culture "compliance ideologies," due to this 
stabilizing and maintaining effect. "A compliance ideology rests both on generalized 
notions of what is morally acceptable and on regulations (customary or codified) that 
translate what is acceptable into specific guides for action. The study of political culture, 
as I use the term, is the study of compliance ideologies and the way they legitimize 
systems of institutional control" (Wilson, 1992:24). Political culture reinforces and 
legitimates the institutions which enforce a society's social contract. 
Wilson centers his notion of political culture on "conceptual axes." These axes 
are comprised of two components: cognitive and moral. Conceptual axes of compliance 
ideologies represent the point at which two sides of individuals (and aggregately the 
society's motivations and ultimately worldview) intersect. Wilson's cognitive axis 
represents the rational, self-interested, economics driven model ofmotivation and 
personal success. The moral axis represents the emotional, irrational, and often times 
relational motivations of individuals. The point of intersection of these axes represents 
the "compromise that is arrived at between the demands of the group and the needs of the 
individuals is formulated in compliance ideologies as moral guidelines" (Wilson, 
1992:82). Consonant with the approach assumed here, I will argue that over a period of 
time, due to many factors rather than an earth-altering event, the conceptual axes shift 
slowly and as they shift the political culture of a society shifts and development occurs. 
This gradualist approach to development is directly tied to the previous discussion on 
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concepts and conceptions. The consensus on our dominate concepts changes 
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incrementally individual to individual through open debate and contribution to structuring 
society. 
Wilson identifies four phases of development. The "archaic," or pre-state, phase 
was dominated by kinship ties and fatalistic beliefs in warring gods. The shift to the 
"traditional" phase was marked by three general trends: the development of monotheism, 
the beginning of law, and the rise ofworld religions. Wilson also points to technological 
advances that fundamentally changed the way people communicated and lived, such as 
advances in agriculture, shipbuilding, advance methods of warfare, and elaboration of 
writing techniques. A slow shift occurred in society's compromise of individual 
freedoms and autonomy, as well as in their obligations and relation to the community 
around them. This phase was characterized by a focus on stability and strict hierarchical 
system. Solely the class structure and status determined an individual's rights and 
responsibilities. Wilson identifies a catalyst that pushed society toward the third, 
"modern" phase as the idea "that fairness requires like cases to be treated alike" (Wilson, 
1992:70). The modern phase, which we are now in, has been dominated by property 
relations. The compromise was structured around the competing view of rights as 
property of equal individuals and rights as community property. Wilson's fourth phase, 
emergent, has not yet arrived. Wilson hypothesizes it will be dominated by a new 
evaluation of personal worth. Individuals will be measured by their ethical worth. The 
dominance of property and a hierarchy will wane and society will develop to a new moral 
high ground. 
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The importance ofWilson's stages here is his analysis of the modem phase and in 
the process of change. For Wilson, the modem phase's reliance on property as a unifying 
concept, a kind of common language, taints our advancement in individual freedoms and 
liberties and prevents our development. I concur with this view in so much as I argue 
society must remove economics from civics. Narrow liberalism has defined individual 
freedom and morality solely in economic terms. The higher goal of creating virtuous 
citizens has been swept aside in search of the almighty dollar. The narrow liberal 
assumption that all humans act rationally and rights are merely property to hold and 
control has created an atomistic, consumeristic society that lacks the civic culture 
necessary to develop beyond our current compliance ideology. 
To demonstrate my point further, let's consider the shift from the traditional to 
the modem. The transition completed the establishment ofdemocracy and the rule of 
law. It advanced our understanding of toleration, fairness, equality and rights. The 
change did not occur uniformly throughout the world, or even within a single country. 
Regions and individuals still clung to the traditional system. But the dominant concepts 
and agreements did indeed shift. As Wilson describes the process, "it proceeds at both 
the individual and ideological level, slowly, interactively, incrementally, and 
disjointedly" (Wilson 1992:75). 
VI. Measuring Our Public Philosophy 
An essential flaw in Wilson and most every other author's attempt to analyze and 
discuss political culture and change is the lack ofreliable empirical methods of 
measurement. While I have advanced a normative argument it is also the goal of this 
work to establish a new conception of political culture and infer new ways to measure 
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change. This work has sought to establish a theoretical argument on the nature of our 
public philosophy and the necessary steps for democracy's advancement. Much of this 
debate has been centered around the abstraction of theories from anecdotes and contrived 
notions of life as we experience it. To effectively claim a theory to be anything more 
than this, a historical or empirical test must be administered. Amy McCready effectively 
argues that both Rawls and Sandel's critique ofRawls, while advancing successfully our 
understandings of the self and motivations, fall short of convincingly explaining the 
world around us for this very reason. "Without a grounding in history or some sort of 
empirical reality, Sandel's theory is subject to the same criticism that it launches at 
liberalism-that a theory abstracted from specific situations and constructed of 
conceptions only cannot justify itself or offer guidance to the world as it is" (McCready 
1998:25). The next step is to determine that the problem as theory is really occurring 
through the creation of an empirical test. 
Many have attempted to conceptualize and empiricize political culture. The 
theoretical argument presented above points to a new way to measure our political 
culture. Determining what is culturally necessary for the foundations ofdemocracy and 
its development requires empirical measurement, analysis, and comparison over time. In 
many cases, this question has been posed in terms of cultural support for democracy and 
the measurements used, specifically voter registration and participation, have invariably 
been found unreliable (Laitin, 1995). I seek to establish an agenda for the creation an 
empirical test based on three indices as quantifications of the pillars of self-government, 
(a civic ties index, a directive function index, and an individual liberties index) which, 
when considered as a ratio, define political culture. These indices directly flow from the 
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theoretical arguments made above and hopefully will be more successful at measuring 
democracy's political culture because these measures stem from a more precise 
theoretical understanding ofwhat democracy produces and what it is founded upon. 
An important clarification must be made at this point. The theoretical debate has 
generally assumed a zero sum relationship between individual freedom and civic ties. I 
do not agree with this empirical conceptualization. Sandel and the liberals he critiques 
fall into the trap ofzero sum arguments. It is not the case that as a society increases 
individual freedoms, civic meaning must decrease. Instead, my argument points to a ratio 
conception implied in Wilson's understanding of conceptual axes. He viewed the 
relationship as a ratio between defining the rights of individuals and defining obligations 
to the community. "Contractual obligations, which stress defined limits to authority, the 
intrinsic value of the individual, and the legal guarantees regarding negotiating processes, 
are paired, in some ratio, with positional obligations that stress mutuality, community 
need, and an organic view of society" (Wilson, 1992:89). Much as Wilson understood 
the compromise of these obligations to be the definition of the current "compliance 
ideology," I shall define and argue that the ratio at which we find these three indices 
defines empirically, our current political culture. 
The three-part ratio, which would empiricize political culture, consists of a civic 
ties index as the first ramification of the ratio. The civic ties index would measure the 
side of the public philosophy de-emphasized by narrow liberalism, civic meaning. This 
measure would attempt to index several different measures into one comparable point. 
By plugging this value into a ratio we can measure its relative strength and importance in 
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society. And we can also draw conclusions, one step removed, as to the effectiveness of 
the current institutional and regulative structures' abilities to engender civic engagement. 
Possible measures in the civic ties index seek to measure non-individual interest 
based behavior. Tax morality, the level of citizens' timely payment oftaxes, can be seen 
as a direct measure of their support for the regime and their commitment to any social 
programs funded through their tax contributions. A useful tool in developing the civic 
ties index would be a mass survey. A survey, while impossible to go back in time and 
survey from the first two of Wilson's phases, would still be very useful for measuring 
current attitudinal levels of support and engagement. This tool would provide researchers 
with an individual measure which could be aggregated to the community and provide 
clear evidence of community perceptions of civicness. Neighborhood action 
associations, sports clubs, health clubs, social clubs, community action groups, corporate 
community improvement initiatives could all be used to measure the amount of 
individual involvement in non-government, private sector forms ofparticipation and 
community improvement. Measuring per capita charitable donations and hours of 
volunteer work would also help to measure civic engagement. New forms of community 
participation must also be identified, such as Internet chat groups and recycling levels. 
The civic ties index seeks to accurately measure new wave forms of civic engagement. 
Just as the challenge is to create new ways produce civic ties, our index must be able to 
identify these mechanisms and their effects in order to paint an accurate picture of our 
society's civicness. 
The middle measure in the ratio is the directive function index. This index 
represents a photo negative of the public regulation pillar of self-government. Instead of 
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variables more to the point of producing virtuous citizens. This means the ways in which 
society and the institutional structures it creates promote and achieve debate and thus, 
consent by contribution. By combining measures ofboth institutional mechanisms and 
actual levels of direct citizen participation into a single index, a measure will be created 
determining an exact level ofboth opportunity for and actual levels of popular directive 
control over government action and policy, essentially the level ofpolitical contribution. 
Including measures from each branch and level of government is essential in any 
attempt to measure the true level of citizen direction and participation in their 
government. Voter participation, while proven to be unreliable by itself as an indicator 
of civic participation, must still be included in the directive function index. As a direct 
measure of citizen engagement in self-government voting at all levels of government 
cannot be ignored. Highly correlated to voting, but measuring citizens' ability and 
propensity to have elements of direct democracy, would be measuring the frequency of 
recalls, initiatives and referenda. The index must include whether or not these avenues of 
recourse are available to citizens as well as their actual use of such mechanisms. This 
variable would give a direct measure of citizens' willingness to dictate to or overrule the 
legislative assemblies, elections of executives, and appointments ofjudges. Again this 
measure requires data from all levels of government. As Putnam and others have 
demonstrated, the number of free press operations and the level of newspaper 
subscriptions provides an accurate measure of citizen political socialization and trigger 
public debate on the issues ofthe day. As argued in the section on surface characteristic 
of democracy, public debate is heard by those in power, and in an effective democracy, 
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that debate directly affects policy well beyond Schumpeter's "throwing the bums out" 
view of elections. Press operations and newspaper subscriptions are a measure of 
society's interests in and thus participation in affecting government and public policy. 
From the judicial standpoint, institutions such as trial by jury and grand jury 
general statements provide citizens with a directive function over judicial precedence. 
Measuring level of exceptions from jury duty and the frequency of grand jury general 
statements could provide a more exact measure of directive action than a simple 
dichotomous measure. A measurement ofbureaucratic power and responsibility should 
be included as a negative measure of directive action. Measuring budget levels, levels of 
discretionary spending, percent of federal a state budgets supporting semi-autonomous 
agencies, and number of persons employed by the government bureaucracy are all 
possible ways to measure bureaucratic power and insulation from directive action. Some 
form of this measure must be included to obtain an accurate picture of the true power of 
directive actions. For this index, a mass survey needs to address issues of efficacy and 
channels to government. This survey must be designed in such a way to avoid the 
masking effects of narrow liberalism's view of procedural regulation as the will of the 
people. Local governments' ability to tax citizens and develop their own spending 
programs would also be a possible variable to include in this index. Assuming the 
accuracy of the argument that local and state governments are "closer" to the people and 
therefore more responsive, these governments' levels of autonomy, which is directly tied 
to funding discretion, should provide another way in which to measure the strength of 
directive actions. Again, identifying new ways to communicate with and affecting policy 
makers is crucial to the accuracy of the index. These might include news ways of protest, 
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discussion, and debate or the evolution ofold practices such as writing a letter to your 
congressman, but now the index must include e-mail levels to congressional offices. By 
indexing all these different aspects of directive action, it will be possible to compare this 
phenomenon to the other sides of the ratio in an attempt to determine the state of our 
political culture. 
The third and final side to the ratio is the individual liberties index. As I have 
argued, the focus and progress achieved by narrow liberalism has mainly come in this 
arena. The United States has witnessed fundamental changes in the way individual 
liberties are protected and an expansion of those liberties to virtually all sectors of our 
population. A mass survey of citizens would provide an attitudinal foundation for the 
index. Measuring peoples' opinions ofnot only their own rights, but also how they view 
the rights ofminority and marginalized sectors ofour population provides an insight into 
institutional and cultural successes. It will also point to areas that still require efforts to 
overcome engrained cultural barriers to universal individual liberty protection. A simple 
dichotomous coding ofbasic rights protected under the law would include freedom of 
religion, speech, to a trial by jury, to petition the government, from unreasonable search 
and seizure, and from cruel and unusual punishment and guarantees ofhabeas corpus. 
Each of these freedoms connect to form the basic foundation of individual rights and 
must be included. A way to measure the ongoing process of redefining liberties and 
expanding the inclusion ofmarginalized sectors of the population would be to include 
civil liberties minority rights legislative initiatives per legislative session. A key to this 
index is the ability to measure the effectiveness and breadth ofthe enforcement of the 
laws and structures and whether this enforcement is changing attitudes. The survey 
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portion of the index should be able to tap into the change in attitudes or lack thereof, but I 
am unable to detennine an accurate way to measure enforcement issues. This will be a 
difficult challenge for the researcher who attempts to collect the data necessary for this 
empirical analysis. 
Narrow liberalism of the twentieth century has achieved great gains in the realm 
of the individual liberty index, while only modest gains in the directive function index 
have been achieved. Sandel would argue, and there is some evidence to support this 
claim, that civic ties measures have actually diminished during this period. As a result, 
we as a society have reverted to a less ideal fonn of government less capable of 
producing virtuous citizens. This is implying a certain doomsday atmosphere to the 
debate which I do not think the theory or the empirical evidence supports. Derek Bok's 
1996 work, The State of the Nation, demonstrates the difficulties in measuring civicness 
and the mixed empirical indicators. I expect to find similar results with indicators of 
stagnation or at best a slight increase in measures of civic ties. This certainly does not 
lead to cataclysmic foretelling of the destruction of self-government. In the context of 
the discussion on development, this does point toward a transition period during which 
the ratio is attempting to find a new equilibrium. The problems Sandel and others have 
identified concerning the lack of growth in civic engagement and participation could be a 
sign that this transition is taking place. Once one side of the ratio has increased i.e. 
individual liberties, the other sides must find new ways to develop in the context of this 
development. As stated previously, the challenge is to find new ways of engendering 
civic engagement and the creation ofnew opportunities for participation in the context of 
our new understandings of individual liberties. Wilson's emergent phase will be 
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achieved when society's dominant conceptions have altered and redefined our concepts 
and institutions in such a way that a new equilibrium between the three indices is 
achieved that produces more virtuous citizens than before. 
Conclusion 
Narrow liberalism has triumphed in America for the last fifty years. As a society 
we have achieved great procedural reforms and expanded our legal definitions of citizen, 
intrinsic liberties, and public (government) responsibility. These great achievements 
have not come without an honorable but deadly battle. The civil rights workers of the 
1950s and 1960s endured the hardships of an intolerant South and a complacent nation. 
Only after many thousands had protested and hundreds had died did we achieve 
procedural reforms protecting minority voting rights and civil liberties. And thirty years 
later, this country is still searching for an answer to our race relation problems. The 
simple truth is that procedure does not change a society, black or white. Procedure and 
institutions are tools. They are vehicles for the development of a society's public 
philosophy. While procedural institutions are inescapable, they do not solely define 
democracy. 
The aim ofthis work was to set forth a normative argument as to the nature of our 
political culture, which could lead researchers to a way ofmeasuring our culture and find 
ways to move beyond our current state. Stated simply, there are three pillars of 
democracy: individual freedom, public regulation, and civic meaning. Narrow liberalism 
of the last fifty years has focused on individual freedom using public regulation while 
neglecting civic meaning. For democracy to develop, all three pillars must change, grow 
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and become more adept in helping create virtuous citizens. If our aim is to produce free 
and complete individuals then we require a government and a society, which engage in a 
formative project. Civic meaning refers to an aggregate level notion of community, 
nation, and state. But it also has an individual level reference, the idea that we are not 
actors in a vacuum and that to be virtuous and complete, we have to contribute to the 
greater good around us. This requires civic participation and engagement. Our 
government and society are more virtuous when citizens use their own reasoning ability 
to contribute to the society and thereby grant consent. This process ofusing one's 
reasoning ability to contribute and by which a government establishes legitimacy and 
virtue is essential for the individual as well. To develop individually, we must engage 
and participate in the world around us, or we can never obtain the virtue we seek. 
This is essentially a new political culture paradigm. Values are not separate from 
institutions and incentives, but rather are essential components of political culture. While 
I have not addressed this directly, it is important to note that I have assumed and implied 
the interdependence of these actors throughout the work. In the end, I have constructed 
and empirical conception of political culture. The construction is of a three-part ratio: a 
civic ties index, a directive function index, and a individual liberties index. The 
normative claims I have advanced are unsubstantiated. While anecdotes and historical 
context have been used by Putnam, Sandel and others to further this claim, what is 
lacking has been a successful empirical measure of political culture. I have set forth a 
possible test to be used in determining the state of society's civicness and political culture 
in general. While obviously untested more work along this line is essential. 
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The greatest design task, that I foresee concerns the transitional period and how to 
identify it. During a transition from one type of culture to another more than attitudes 
and concepts change. Much of how we measure this change is through the institutions 
that are created. Not knowing in advance what the emerging political culture wi11look 
like, there will be high levels of contention as research point to new types of institutions 
for evidence. Sandel and others like him who have correctly critiqued narrow liberalism, 
must continue to be aware of new ways to measure the change around us so that we do 
not miss it. 
The equilibrium of public regulation, individual liberties and civic meaning is in a 
state of transition. Narrow liberalism has achieved great strides in individual liberty but 
the other pillars of democracy have been neglected. They are not crumbling; democracy 
is not in danger of collapsing. The speed of development is the point of concern. A 
period of transition has begun. The ratio, which defines our political culture, is searching 
for a new equilibrium. The challenge is to find new ways and institutions to develop 
civic meaning and put public regulation back in the hands of the citizens, while 
maintaining the gains in individual liberties. The balance to be struck is one between 
freedom and coercion, between the individual and community, between liberty and 
cultural stagnation. 
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